This monograph provides a structured overview of costing system research that can explain the variation in the characteristics and properties of costing systems found in practice based on firms’ source(s) of their demand for cost information. Costing systems are not developed in a vacuum but are designed to fulfill a purpose. In order to have a meaningful decision on the various demands for cost information, I start in Part 1 by exploring the different techniques firms can use to supply cost information to its managers and employees.
This paper provides evidence on the determinants and economic outcomes of updates of accounting systems (AS) over a 24-year time-span in a large sample of U.S. hospitals.
We investigate how auditor alignment, i.e. parent and subsidiary are audited by auditors from the same audit firm network, affects the quality of the internal information environment of groups and their subsidiaries decision making and performance management processes. We predict that auditor alignment improves internal information quality via better information coordination across the group, and via lower internal information asymmetry between parent and subsidiaries.
Beginning with Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003), a rapidly growing literature attributes the short-run asymmetric cost response to activity changes (i.e., sticky costs) as resulting from short-run managerial choices. In this paper, we are agnostic on the theory of sticky costs. Rather, we focus on empirical tests of cost stickiness.
This paper aims to advance the use of numerical experiments to investigate issues that surround the design of cost systems. As with laboratory and field experiments, researchers must decide on the independent variables and their levels, the experimental design, and the dependent variables. Options for dependent and independent variables are ample, as are the ways in which we can model the relations among these variables.
We study the effect of senior manager oversight on inventors’ productivity. We use changes in travel times between inventors and their employer’s headquarters caused by flight time changes as sources of plausibly exogenous variation in manager oversight of inventors.