The patent system grants inventors temporary monopoly rights in exchange for a public disclosure detailing their innovation. These disclosures are meant to allow others to recreate and build on the patented innovation. We examine how the quality of these disclosures affects follow-on innovation.
We examine how firms’ accounting quality affects their reaction to monetary policy. The balance sheet channel of monetary policy predicts that the quality of firms’ accounting reports plays a role in transmitting monetary policy by affecting information asymmetries between firms and capital providers.
We examine how product market competition affects the disclosure of innovation. Theory posits that product market competition can cause firms to increase their disclosure of innovation to deter competitors. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that patent applicants in more competitive industries voluntarily accelerate their patent disclosures, which are credibly disclosed via the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
We study the effect of senior manager oversight on inventors’ productivity. We use changes in travel times between inventors and their employer’s headquarters caused by flight time changes as sources of plausibly exogenous variation in manager oversight of inventors.