Professor of Finance, London Business School; Academic Director, Centre for Corporate Governance; Managing Editor, Review of Finance and 2022 Kenan Institute Distinguished Fellow
Fred Kayne (1960) Career Development Professor of Entrepreneurship and Assistant Professor of Technological Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Strategic Management, MIT Sloan School of Management and 2022 Kenan Institute Distinguished Fellow
Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Michigan Ross School of Business and 2022 Kenan Institute Distinguished Fellow
Associate Director of Research, Center for the Business of Health; UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School
Professor in Psychology and Neuroscience; Adjunct Professor in Organizational Behavior, Kenan-Flagler Business School
Associate Professor of Strategy and Entrepreneurship, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School, and 2025 Kenan Institute Distinguished Fellow
Research Economist, Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise; Assistant Research Professor, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School
In various forms, research on stress and well-being has been a part of the Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP) since its inception. In this review, we examine the history of stress research in JAP by tracking word frequencies from 606 abstracts of published articles in the journal.
We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic cost of stigma associated with banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve's Discount Window (DW) during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Amendment of IAS 39 by the IASB in 2008 provided an option to reclassify investments from fair value to historical cost. We predict that too-important-to-fail (TITF) banks took less advantage of this option because the political protection they enjoyed insulated them from regulatory pressure. Banks that did not enjoy this protection had greater reason to make use of this option since doing so would protect their Tier 1 capital.
The collapse of the securitization market during the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis resulted from investors’ concern with the value of securitized assets and securities issued by special purpose entities (SPEs). Research has shown that prior to the Crisis, investors valued equity of sponsor-originator banks (S-Os) as if there were an implicit guarantee extended to SPE creditors that would be fully honored. We predict that the Crisis caused investors to value S-O equity as if such guarantees would not be honored.