Over 1960 to 2017, we show that a positive risk premium from holding high-beta stocks (versus low-beta stocks) and small-cap stocks (versus large-cap stocks) is reliably earned only after the expected stock-market volatility breaches an approximate top-quintile threshold. The high conditional average returns with this nonlinear risk-return phenomenon are persistently evident over months t+1 to t+6 following a volatility-threshold breach in month t-1.
Focusing on a key CEO characteristic, materialism, we investigate how the prevalence of materialistic CEOs in the banking sector has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, the behavior of non-CEO executives and bank tail risk vary with CEO materialism.
Focusing on the ten countries with the most-traded currencies, we provide novel empirical evidence about the existence of significant heterogenous exposure to global growth news shocks.
Using hand-collected data on succession planning disclosures, we study how having a formal succession plan affects the efficiency of CEO turnovers. We find that firms with succession plans have a lower likelihood of forced CEO turnovers and non-CEO executive team resignations.
Hospital emergency departments (EDs) provide around-the-clock medical care and as such are generally modeled as nonterminating queues. However, from the care provider’s point of view, ED care is not a never-ending process, but rather occurs in discrete work shifts and may require passing unfinished work to the next care provider at the end of the shift.
We study complexity in the market for securitized products, a market at the heart of the financial crisis of 2007–9. The complexity of these products rose substantially in the years preceding the financial crisis. We find that securities in more complex deals default more and have lower realized returns.
We model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and study how endogenous government interventions mitigate coordination failures. We establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness, and we show that one intervention can affect another through altering the public information structure.
This unique Companion provides a comprehensive overview and critical evaluation of existing conceptualizations and new developments in innovation research.
We use unique data on employee decisions in the employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) of U.S. public firms to measure the influence of networks on investment decisions. Comparing only employees within a firm during the same election window and controlling for a metro area fixed effect, we find that the local choices of coworkers to participate in the firm’s ESPP exert a significant influence on employees’ own decisions to participate.
Voting outcomes can differ from underlying preferences due to strategic selection into voting. One explanation for such selection effects is lower participation of shareholders with popular preferences (free-rider effect) relative to those with unpopular preferences (underdog effect). We illustrate these effects in a rational choice model in which the voting participation decision depends on the probability of being pivotal and the costs and benefits of voting.
Using unique data on employee ownership plans sponsored by U.S. public companies, we find that large negative market shocks lead to active changes in portfolio choices among inexperienced and previously inattentive investors. We use employee ownership plans to identify a set of inexperienced investors who did not actively select to participate in the market and who are confronted with a difficult financial decision.
We consider a manufacturer serving a retailer that sells its product to customers over two periods. Each firm determines its unit price. The retailer orders the product from the manufacturer prior to the beginning of the selling periods.
The prevailing view of implied volatility comovements, IVC, defined as the correlation between a firm’s implied volatility and the market’s implied volatility, is that they indicate the presence of systematic volatility risk to the firm’s investors. We take a different stance and conjecture that implied volatility comovements can also indicate expected information arrival for both the firm and aggregate equity markets, and we find evidence supporting this view.
We study complexity in the market for securitized products, a market at the heart of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The complexity of these products rose substantially in the years preceding the financial crisis. We find that securities in more complex deals default more and have lower realized returns. The worse performance is economically meaningful: a one standard deviation increase in complexity represents an 18% increase in default on AAA securities. However, yields of more complex securities are not higher indicating that investors did not perceive them as riskier. Our results are consistent with complexity obfuscating security quality.
The goal of this paper is to conduct a survival analysis to determine the causal impact of federal R&D subsidies on firms’ long-term survival.
Entrepreneurs are turning to crowdfunding as a way to finance their creative ideas. Crowdfunding involves relatively small contributions of many consumer-investors over a fixed time period (generally a few weeks). The purpose of this paper is to add to our empirical understanding of backer dynamics over the project funding cycle.
While call centers have recently invested in callback technology, the impact of this innovation on callers’ behavior and call center performance has been less clearly understood. Using call center data from a US commercial bank, we perform an empirical study of callers’ decisionmaking process in the presence of a callback option.
Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top- and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent.
Over the 1990 to 2014 period, we show that the macroeconomic-uncertainty index of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) is a powerful determinant of the slope in Treasury forward interest rates over the 10- to 30-year term-structure segment.